{"id":1209,"date":"2010-10-15T15:31:57","date_gmt":"2010-10-15T19:31:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/engineering.jhu.edu\/magazine-archive\/?p=1209"},"modified":"2017-07-31T15:33:38","modified_gmt":"2017-07-31T19:33:38","slug":"planning-failure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/engineering.jhu.edu\/magazine-archive\/2010\/10\/planning-failure\/","title":{"rendered":"Planning for Failure"},"content":{"rendered":"

Last spring’s massive oil spill off the Gulf Coast left responders scrambling to deal with the aftermath. What lessons did we learn? Three Hopkins engineers offer their expertise from the field.<\/em> By Christen Brownlee<\/p>\n

\"oil_spill\"<\/a>Just outside the office of geography and environmental engineering professor Ed Bouwer sits a filing cabinet topped with two small fishbowls, each holding a single purplish-blue betta. Paper signs taped below each bowl offer details on each fish: Sushiflower, on the right, names roast beef as his favorite food. Vicious Vinnie, to the left, was rescued from an epic battle with another unnamed fish in which he lost his tail. But it\u2019s growing back nicely now.<\/p>\n

Despite any previous traumas, on this sunny afternoon both fish hover lazily in the middle of their peaceful simulated-natural habitats, blissfully unaware of the disaster that had befallen their aquatic brethren down south. For three months, oil gushed practically unchecked from a pipe jutting out of the sea floor about 41 miles off the coast of Louisiana. A portion of the oil poisoned fish and other sea life, as well as the nearby beaches and wetlands. By the time the well was capped, nearly 5 million barrels of crude had spilled into the Gulf of Mexico from the remains of the Deepwater Horizon well, making this among the worst oil spills ever in human history, not to mention in American waters.<\/p>\n

What can we learn?<\/p>\n

As long as humans have had access to oil, accidents have happened\u2014in 2010 alone, at least 13 other documented oil spills took place around the globe. Yet, no matter how many spills the world contends with, responders often desperately scramble to deal with the aftermath, taking with them few lessons to prepare for future disasters.<\/p>\n

While no one hopes to see another Deepwater Horizon\u2013scale accident, some Whiting School faculty are devoting their time to studying the spill, producing research, and generating ideas that may help responders react more effectively to future oil spills. \u201c<\/p>\n

There are more and more oil rigs out there, and chances are high that another one will eventually have a spill. The take-home message is that we have to make sure we learn from these failures,\u201d says Bouwer.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"bird_1\"<\/a>1. Examine the \u201cBefore\u201d<\/strong>
\nIn the early days of the Deepwater Horizon accident, Ed Bouwer says that he and his colleagues weren\u2019t particularly alarmed. \u201cOf all the contaminants that we work with, oil is the least toxic,\u201d says Bouwer, chair of the Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering and the Abel Wolman Professor of Environmental Engineering at the Whiting School. Though a spill can be a terrible thing for the environment in the short term, he explains, the Earth is relatively good at assimilating oil over the long haul. Unlike many pollutants, oil is biodegradable. It\u2019s also a good food source for many species of microbes, which regularly munch on oil that bubbles up naturally from undersea vents.<\/p>\n

However, the Deepwater Horizon accident turned out to be a far cry from a natural event. \u201cWhen I learned about the magnitude, it was clear that things had gotten really out of hand,\u201d adds Bouwer.<\/p>\n

As he and millions of people around the world watched the news each night, mingled among footage of the still-smoldering rig and gunked-up wildlife was video of cleanup crews working to wrangle the spreading oil and mop it up from beaches. However, once this disaster wound to a close, how would these crews and researchers know that the environment was truly clean?<\/p>\n

\u201cThe oil company will argue that things are back to normal, but how do you know if the ecosystem is still damaged? You need a \u2018before\u2019 to understand the \u2018after\u2019\u2014a baseline for comparison,\u201d says Bouwer, whose Hopkins lab looks at ways to clean up contaminants in water and also examines how these pollutants move through the environment and behave in ecosystems.<\/p>\n

This summer, he and his lab were tapped to join a research project to put together that pre-oil picture for the Deepwater Horizon spill in Sarasota Bay, Florida. As of mid-July, when Bouwer\u2019s team joined the project, this area had not yet been affected by the spill. But with a location just 70 miles from the leaking well, researchers expect that currents eventually will carry oil to this ecologically sensitive estuary. In this project led by the National Aquarium in Baltimore, in collaboration with the Sarasota-based Mote Marine Laboratory and Johns Hopkins\u2019 Center for Contaminant Transport, Fate, and Remediation, which Bouwer directs, researchers headed in quickly to the bay before oil arrived and took a wide range of samples from water, sediments, wildlife, and plants, analyzing their chemical signatures. They\u2019ll continue to do the same at regular intervals once oil invades the Bay.<\/p>\n

Bouwer and his colleagues are using data from both the baseline samples and afterward to generate models of how oil and its compounds move through the environment\u2014how these chemicals are transferred through the complicated food chain, accumulating in sea life, and how they might affect humans who consume affected seafood.<\/p>\n

\u201cYou absolutely need that baseline data to construct models to predict what happens after this kind of disaster,\u201d Bouwer says. \u201cThat\u2019s something we\u2019ve been missing in the past.\u201d<\/p>\n

The oil spill\u2013related investigation of water quality that Ed Bouwer conducted this summer has resulted in a new research partnership between Hopkins and the National Aquarium. Bouwer is now leading the university\u2019s involvement in the new National Aquarium Conservation Center. The initiative is aimed at furthering the protection of aquatic ecosystems worldwide through scientific research, education, and advocacy.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"fish_thumb\"<\/a>2. Build Better Robots<\/strong><\/p>\n

Louis Whitcomb, professor and the Louis M. Sardella Faculty Scholar of Mechanical Engineering, is helping to create that all-important \u201cbefore\u201d picture in a different way: through improving the robotic vehicles that offer one of the few ways for researchers to explore the deep ocean.<\/p>\n

When Whitcomb first heard about the Deepwater Horizon spill, he knew that such robots, known in the business as remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), would be involved in investigating the disaster and helping to fix it. Since the 1980s, ROVs have been oceanography\u2019s go-to tool for exploring the deepest depths of the world\u2019s oceans and sampling geology and sea life. These machines are also a must for deep water oil drilling, which generally takes place at depths of 1,000 feet or more, at pressures that can easily crush an unprotected human.<\/p>\n

\u201cThese extreme environments won\u2019t support human life,\u201d says Whitcomb, who directs the Whiting School\u2019s Laboratory for Computational Sensing and Robotics. \u201cThe Deepwater Horizon well is at almost a mile of depth, far below the depth you could use any human diver. ROVs are the only practical and safe means of getting to the wellhead.\u201d<\/p>\n

After the Deepwater Horizon oil rig sank, its owners and operators mobilized a fleet of oilfield service-and-supply vessels under contract. Each of these vessels carries a couple of ROVs that dock inside metal hangars, with long cables attached to lower the robots to the ocean floor. Each ROV (about the size of a minivan) is equipped with cameras to get a 360-degree view. Its two robotic arms are controlled by a human operator, who sits comfortably above the water\u2019s surface in a control room. The images from the cameras and the commands from the human controller travel through a tether that stretches from the ship down to the robot.<\/p>\n

Through such tethered ROVs, BP\u2019s cleanup crew collected all the images of Deepwater Horizon\u2019s broken riser pipe spewing oil into the water. Though this setup is fine for maintaining an undersea oil well or even taking small exploratory jaunts on the ocean floor, it severely limits the expansive exploration necessary for getting a topographically accurate map of the sea floor or a complete census of sea life\u2014two steps toward understanding the undersea environment in advance of drilling or trying to mitigate a major oil-related disaster.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt\u2019s a fact of life that drilling in the ocean will continue in my lifetime\u2014I don\u2019t have any illusions about that,\u201d says Whitcomb. \u201cWe need better technology to extend scientists\u2019 hands, eyes, and ears to probe these environments and do ongoing assessments where we\u2019re mining oil, gas, and minerals from the sea floor.\u201d<\/p>\n

The need for better tools to more precisely measure the outflow rate from leaking undersea wells became strikingly apparent in the early days of the Deepwater Horizon spill. BP initially estimated that only 1,000 barrels of oil were leaking from the wellhead per day, though many experts immediately suggested that the flow could be much greater.<\/p>\n

Responding to a call from the U.S. Coast Guard for new ways to estimate the flow rate, Whitcomb and colleagues from Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, MIT, and University of Georgia developed a plan. The researchers came up with a novel system that combined imaging sonar, lasers, and Doppler sonar\u2014one of Whitcomb\u2019s areas of expertise\u2014and loaded these different instruments onto an ROV that dived down to the wellhead. Their estimate of 60,000 or more barrels per day was substantially higher than those from other groups. Eventually, that estimate ended up coming close to the official United States Geological Survey estimate of 53,000 barrels per day.<\/p>\n

Whitcomb and his colleagues hope to continue to develop new methods to measure more precisely fluid flow rates in the deep ocean. Besides gauging oil well leaks, these methods might also be employed to precisely measure the fluid outflow of deep-sea hydrothermal vents, a boon to ocean science.<\/p>\n

Moreover, Whitcomb and his team at Hopkins (with colleagues at Woods Hole) are hard at work developing the next wave of robots: untethered autonomous underwater vehicles, or AUVs. These operate on battery power and receive a series of commands to execute\u2014much like the Mars Rover. They can cover a much larger area than tethered ROVs, ranging tens of kilometers away from a surface ship.<\/p>\n

\u201cAll the work we\u2019re doing is directly applicable to understanding the effects of normal large-scale industrial operations in the deep ocean\u2014and abnormal operations as well\u2014by developing better tools for ocean science,\u201d says Whitcomb.<\/p>\n

In late July, Louis Whitcomb and colleagues submitted their final report on the outflow rate of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill to the U.S. Coast Guard. According to Whitcomb, although the team\u2019s final version included more details about their methods and more refined numbers, their initial estimate of flow rate was right on target.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"turtle\"<\/a>3. Know the Way of the Waves<\/strong><\/p>\n

Researchers need not only to get a better grasp on current conditions, but also to gain a better understanding of how oil migrates from a disaster site and how to contain its spread. Tony Dalrymple, the Willard and Lillian Hackerman Professor of Civil Engineering, whose research focuses on modeling waves and on engineering coastlines to enhance safety, notes how little researchers know on topics that might help alleviate oil spills.<\/p>\n

\u201cAfter the Exxon Valdez spill, there was a fair amount of money devoted to research on oil containment, but with time this money has gone away,\u201d he explains. Much of the technology being used to combat the Deepwater Horizon spill, he adds, is decades old. Additionally, many of the fixes that were proposed or implemented have not been thoroughly researched and may affect other parts of the ecosystem in unknown ways.<\/p>\n

For example, Louisiana and some other coastal states were eager to build sand berms, long dams made out of sand, to block oil from reaching the coastline. Louisiana in particular, which started building the berms within weeks of the Deepwater Horizon spill, planned to get the necessary sand for the project by dredging it from nearby barrier islands.<\/p>\n

However, Dalrymple notes, the consequences of building such sand berms are unknown. Dredging the sand from offshore shoals could affect the nearby islands in a way that makes the coastline more susceptible to tropical storms and hurricanes. The berms may also weaken the health of wetlands even more than the oil, since these marshes need tidal flushing to stay alive. The berms probably wouldn\u2019t be a long-lasting fix anyway, eventually eroding from the action of waves. (The United States federal government shared similar views with Dalrymple\u2014they put a stop to the $360 million project on June 24.)<\/p>\n

Similarly, researchers have no clear picture on how oil mixed with water changes wave behavior, a factor that might influence oil\u2019s spread. Showing a visitor a photo of a curly wave spotted with brownish-orange oil blobs like a piece of amber jewelry, Dalrymple pointed out the wave\u2019s unusual formation\u2014the oil\u2019s heavier viscosity had dampened the wave\u2019s motion.<\/p>\n

Though Dalrymple\u2019s current wave modeling research is more focused on understanding the effects of sediments, he notes that the models he\u2019s developing could also be useful for understanding the effects of oil on top of water and how oily waves might be affected by wind blowing or various weather conditions.<\/p>\n

Regardless, he notes, his research and that of others could help add to the stockpile of knowledge necessary to act quickly in the event of another oil spill disaster.<\/p>\n

\u201cClearly, no one expected something bad to happen, because we were woefully unprepared to deal with it,\u201d says Dalrymple. \u201cThe biggest problem underlying this and other disasters is the failure to plan for failure.\u201d<\/p>\n

Ideally, the next time disaster strikes, he adds, the world will be better prepared.<\/p>\n

Even before the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, Tony Dalrymple had a deep knowledge of the fragile Louisiana coastline. After Katrina, Dalrymple was part of the first engineering team (a group organized by the American Society of Civil Engineers) to enter New Orleans to determine the causes of the levee failures. He then chaired a National Research Council committee that examined the Army Corps of Engineers\u2019 plans to provide hurricane protection to southern Louisiana. This fall, Dalrymple is drawing upon his expertise as a newly appointed member of the state of Louisiana\u2019s Office of Coastal Protection and Restoration Master Plan Science and Engineering Board. In this capacity Dalrymple will help make recommendations about how the state should spend its coastal protection dollars. Provided by the federal government and through future offshore oil and gas revenues, the fund is the nation\u2019s largest designated for coastal protection efforts.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Last spring’s massive oil spill off the Gulf Coast left responders scrambling to deal with the aftermath. What lessons did we learn? Three Hopkins engineers offer their expertise from the field.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[28],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1209","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-features","issue-fall-2010"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nPlanning for Failure - JHU Engineering Magazine<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/engineering.jhu.edu\/magazine-archive\/2010\/10\/planning-failure\/\" \/>\n<link rel=\"next\" href=\"https:\/\/engineering.jhu.edu\/magazine-archive\/2010\/10\/planning-failure\/2\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Planning for Failure - JHU Engineering Magazine\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Last spring's massive oil spill off the Gulf Coast left responders scrambling to deal with the aftermath. 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